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This paper analyzes the reform of the pensionable age as an answer to
the future ﬁnancing problems of public pension systems. We use a two-
staged model where, ﬁrstly, the government decides the redistribution level
of the pension system, and, secondly, individuals face a voting process on
the legal retirement age. Our results suggest that an increase in the re-
distributive character of the system could lead to a larger social consensus
to postpone the legal retirement age. Surprisingly, it could be the case
that the richest people would support more redistribution if that implies to
postpone the pensionable age.
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21. Introduction
Reforms of Social Security systems is now one of the main issues of economic
policy agenda of most of industrialized countries. It is widely considered that,
unless there are serious changes, the rise in the number of retirees relative to
workers will threat the viability of pay-as-you-go public pension systems in the
long-run. With the aim of eliminating these future ﬁnancial problems, the central
reforms that are being proposed are raising taxes, cutting pension beneﬁts and/or
raising the age of retirement, see Blondal and Scarpetta (1998) or Gruber and
Wise (1997).
In order to achieve this latter reform, the main economic policy measures
are either to allow a greater ﬂexibility in Social Security’s retirement rules (e.g.
Germany, Italy or Sweden), to reinforce the link between life-time contributions
and pension beneﬁts or to postpone the pensionable age. In point of fact, this last
measure is one of the policy conclusions of Maintaining Prosperity in an Ageing
Society,O E C D(1998): ”...a direct way to encourage people to work longer would
be to raise the pensionable age”.
However, according to recent surveys, most of workers declare that they are
happy with the current retirement age (see Cremer and Pestieau, 2003), which
3suggests that reforms on the retirement age are becoming a delicate matter for
governments. For this reason, this paper analyzes this issue: the reform of the
pensionable age.
Social Security systems are usually deﬁned by three variables, its size, its
redistributive character and its pensionable or legal retirement age. As mentioned
above, aiming at delaying the retirement decisions of individuals, some reforms are
dealing with the two last variables. In order to focus attention on those reforms,
we will assume that the contribution tax rate, which basically determines the size
of the system, is given. Thus, we will concentrate on the relation between the legal
r e t i r e m e n ta g ea n dt h er e d i s t r i b u t i v ec haracter of the pension system by using a
two-staged political economy model. This model is based on Casamatta et al.
(2000). As they pointed out, the redistributive character of the pension system
is an integral part of the deﬁnition of the system in itself. It implies speciﬁc
institutional and administrative arrangements which cannot be overturned in the
short run. For this reason, in the ﬁrst constitutional stage the redistributive
character of the Social Security program will be chosen by the government. In
the second stage, individuals, diﬀerentiated at wage, will face a majority voting
process on the legal retirement age, knowing exactly the redistributive level and
voting accordingly. We leave the determination of the legal retirement age to the
4political process since we want to reﬂect the popular support that changes in the
retirement age may, or may not, have. In Switzerland, for instance, in 1998 there
was a referendum on a single issue, in which the voters approved of a delay of
two years in the female retirement age within the public pension from 62 to 64
(Bütler, 2002). At last, we will also consider away labor market distortions in
order to avoid incentives problems.
Earlier literature dealing with retirement in a political economy environment
has mainly focussed only on the eﬀects of Social Security systems on the indi-
vidual retirement decision.1 Our paper examines the legal retirement age, which
allows us to emphasize the relevance of the indirect ’macro’ eﬀects of changing
the pensionable age, that is, the eﬀects on pension beneﬁts of altering the ratio
workers/retirees, the well-known dependency ratio.
The term ’legal retirement age’ usually refers to the age at which beneﬁts are
available. However, since there are strong incentives to stop working after this
standard entitlement age, in this model we consider the legal retirement age as
the age at which workers have to leave the labor force, that is, as a mandatory
retirement.2 Indeed, the average retirement age in some OECD countries is very
1See for instance, Sheshinski (1978), Crawford and Lilien (1981),Kahn (1988),o rF a b e l( 1994).
From a more general point of view, see Galasso and Profeta (2002) for a survey of the literature
on the political economy of Social Security.
2In some countries there are direct restrictions on work above the standard age (Portugal or
5close to this standard retirement age (e.g. the United Kingdom, Portugal or
Ireland); see Blondal and Scarpetta (1998).3
The main ﬁndings of this study suggest that, for governments trying to post-
pone the pensionable age, it may be appropriate to accompany the deferment of
the legal retirement age with an increase in the redistribution level of the pension
system to ensure a higher political support. Besides, concerning the government’s
decision, we ﬁnd two counterintuitive results. The political process in the second
stage may have such a crucial impact that, on the one hand, governments acting
under a right-wing criterion could have incentives to implement a pension system
with some level of redistribution, and, on the other hand, governments acting
under a left-wing criterion could have incentives to apply a pension system with
no maximal redistribution in order not to extend excessively the working period.
The underlying reason is the following: agents with wages below average will
delay their optimal legal retirement ages as the Social Security system is more
and more redistributive; in consequence, when they are more than 50% of the
Spain make entitlements to pension beneﬁts beyond the standard age conditional on complete
withdrawal from work) or frequently, individuals have to leave their current jobs to receive their
pensions; see Blondal and Scarpetta (1998) or Gruber and Wise (1999).
3If there is a possibility to have an early access to pension beneﬁts with some adjustment in
the value of retirement beneﬁts, the average retirement age is usually found between this age
at which pensions can be accessed and the standard retirement age; see Blondal and Scarpetta
(1998) or Samwick (1998).
6population, the usual case, a more redistributive pension beneﬁt sw o u l dl e a dt o
postpone the elected legal retirement age.
In summary, in those countries where some of the proposed reforms to solve
the viability of the public pension systems is to postpone the pensionable age,
an increase in the redistributive character of the pension system could lead to a
larger social consensus.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 develops the model. Section 3
analyzes the (second stage) majority voting process on the legal retirement stage;
section 4 studies the government’s decision (ﬁrst stage) on redistribution level
of the Social Security program according to three diﬀerent criteria. Section 4
summarizes the main results.
2. The model
Consider a continuous distribution of agents on wage that will be located between
a minimum and a maximum wage level, [wp,w r], belonging to the same generation.
As in most of industrialized countries, we consider that the median wage, wmed,i s
lower than the mean wage,  . There is no uncertainty on the length of life. Each
individual lives exactly T years. On the ﬁrst R years the individual will be a full
7time worker whereas on the following T − R ones the individuals will be retired,
being R the current legal retirement age.
Individuals have a stationary and temporally independent utility function,
which is separable and strictly increasing in consumption and leisure.4 Leisure
yields utility to the individual only when this individual is retired. So the only
way utility coming from leisure can be modiﬁed is by changing the legal retirement
age. The pension beneﬁts are received only after they leave the labor force. The



















i is the consumption at period t of agent i. The utility of consumption is
twice diﬀerentiable with u0 > 0, u00 < 0.L e t lt be the leisure at period t,b e i n g
the utility of leisure v(lt
w)=0 , in their working years and v(lt
R)=v, in their
retirement years. Besides, we assume that the elasticity of consumption marginal
utility ρr = −cu00 (c)/u0 (c) is non-increasing and smaller than one.5
The Social Security system is deﬁned by a constant contribution rate τ ∈ [0,1]
and by a constant intra-generational redistribution degree α ∈ [0,1]. Pension
4Similar to Crawford and Lilien, (1981) or Sheshinski (1978).
5This elasticity is the well-known coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion.
8beneﬁts may be ﬁnanced through two diﬀerent systems. On the one hand, a Pay-
As-You-Go system (PAYG) where pension beneﬁts of retirees are paid by working
people through taxes. On the other hand, a Fully-Funded (FF) system where
pension beneﬁts of retirees are ﬁnanced through the return of the taxes that they
paid during their working life. In the PAYG system the return will depend on
the population growth rate, while in the FF system will depend on the interest
rate. Since we do not address the issue of PAYG vs. FF system, in our theoretical
benchmark pension beneﬁts will be identical under the two systems by considering
both the interest rate and the population rate equal to zero.
Individuals plan consumption, savings and retirement in order to maximize the
discounted value of utility subject to their lifetime budget constraint. While work-
ing individuals earn a ﬁxed gross wage per unit of time wi ∈ [wp,w r].W h i l er e t i r e d
they receive a constant stream of pension beneﬁts per unit of time pi(R,α,wi) from
the Social Security program.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that savings earn no interest and that
individuals do not discount the future. Then, the lifetime utility of the individual











































Separability and concavity of the instantaneous utility function, certain life-
times, and perfect capital markets imply that, in order to maximize (2.2) subject




[Rwi (1 − τ)+( T − R)pi(α,R,wi)]. (2.4)
Pension beneﬁts per unit of time of the individual with wage wi will be equal




τ [(1 − α)  + αwi] (2.5)
where R/(T − R) would be the well-known dependency ratio in a PAYG sys-
tem and the ratio between working and retirement years in the FF system and
[(1 − α)  + αwi] a linear combination of the mean wage,  , and the individual’s
10wage, wi. Depending on the level of α, the type of Social Security may range from a
totally uniform pension beneﬁts scheme (α =0 ) , usually referred as Beveridgean,
to a type in which pension beneﬁts are actuarially fair (α =1 ) , usually referred
as Bismarckian.6
3. Voting on the Legal Retirement Age
Given α, the legal retirement age is chosen through a majority voting system. We
must then identify the median voter and determine her preferred legal retirement
age. Let R∗ (wi) be the optimal legal retirement age of an individual of wage wi.
In order to get the optimal legal retirement age for each individual, we substitute
( 2 . 4 )a n d( 2 . 5 )i n( 2 . 2 ) ,a n da f t e rs o m es i m p l i ﬁcations, the optimization problem







[wi (1 − τ)+τ ((1 − α)  + αwi)]
¶
+( T − R)v (3.1)
From (3.1) the following proposition can be stated.
Proposition 3.1. i)The utility function U (R,w) is single-peaked in R.
6See Casamatta et al. (2000) for a classiﬁcation of several OECD countries depending on the
redistribution character of the Social Security system.
11ii) The optimal legal retirement age increases with the wage. The agent with
t h em e d i a nw a g ei st h em e d i a nv o t e r .
Proof. i) The ﬁrst and second derivatives of the utility function of an individual












00 (ci) < 0 (3.3)
Since (3.3) is negative for all R, preferences are single peaked with respect to
R.
ii)From the F.O.C. of the maximization problem of the utility function (3.1),




[1 − τ (1 − α)][u0 (c)(1− ρr)]




This equation is strictly positive since the relative coeﬃcient of risk aversion, ρr,
is less than one. Q.E.D.
The ﬁrst point of the proposition tells us that any individual has a unique op-
12timal legal retirement age, and therefore, we can apply the median voter theorem
in order to obtain the elected retirement age. The second point states that opti-
mal retirement ages are increasing with the wage level.7 This result arises because
t h en e g a t i v es u b s t i t u t i o ne ﬀect on leisure of a higher wage outweighs the positive
income eﬀect. Thus, the individual with the median wage will be the median
voter, and consequently, R∗ (wmed) will be the elected legal retirement age.8
Let us now analyze how optimal retirement ages of individuals change by
altering the redistribution level of the system. The next proposition states the
eﬀect of α on the preferred legal retirement age.
Proposition 3.2. Consider an individual with a wage level w< (w>  ).T h e
more redistributive the Social Security system, the higher (lower) her preferred
retirement age.
Proof. From F.O.C. of maximization problem (3.1), the implicit function theorem




τ (wi −  )[u0 (c)(1− ρr)]




7This result is similar to that obtained in the analysis of optimal individual retirement deci-
sion in the previous literature.
8We suppose voters have no strategic behaviour. They vote for the closest age to their own
optimal retirement age.
13Since ρr < 1,i fw< (w>  ) then ∂R∗ (wi)/∂α < 0( > 0). Q.E.D.
An increase in the redistribution level of the pension system causes a positive
eﬀect on the optimal decision of the workers with w<  .9 That is, the more
redistributive the pension system is, the more beneﬁts low-wage workers obtain
from postponing the retirement age. The reason is the positive indirect eﬀects
of this postponement, via dependency ratio, on the pension beneﬁts. Therefore,
in order to increase the size of the Social Security system and to reduce their
private savings, they will prefer to delay the legal retirement age. So, since we
have assumed that the median wage is lower than the mean one, wmed <  ,a
more redistributive pension system would lead to a higher elected legal retirement
age.
This result contrasts with that obtained in models in which the pension system
allows for ﬂexible retirement. In those cases, when the retirement decision is
analyzed, it is found that a more redistributive system reduces optimal individual
retirement ages. It is considered, ﬁrst, that the pension system imposes a implicit
tax on postponing retirement and secondly, that this implicit tax is higher, the
more redistributive the system is (see Casamatta et al., 2002).
9Since the two discount factors are equal to zero and there are no borrowing constraints, both
redistributive parameters, α and τ, would cause the same eﬀect on the preferred legal retirement
age.
14Therefore, reforms of public pension systems aiming to delay the retirement
decision by increasing the ﬂexibility of the retirement scheme should be imple-
mented together with increases in the actuarial fairness of the system, in other
words, together with a reduction in the redistributive character of the system. In
this way, the relation between lifetime contributions and pension beneﬁts would
be stronger and disincentives to work would be lower.
However, when the pension system reform is a postponement of the legal age
of entitlement (as in New Zealand, Japan or Italy; see Blondal and Scarpetta,
1998), our model suggests that, in order to increase the political support, the
reform should be accompanied by increases in the redistributive character of the
system, since it would reduce the rejection of the majority of workers, those with
wages lower than the mean one, by improving their pension beneﬁts.
4. The Constitutional Stage: Choosing α
L e tu sn o wa n a l y z eh o wt h ed e g r e eo fr e d i s t r i b u t i o ni sd e t e r m i n e da tt h ec o n s t i -
tutional stage. We deﬁne three social welfare criteria, the Downsian, the left-wing
and the right-wing criterion.Ag o v e r n m e n tw i t haDownsian criterion will care
only about the median citizen. And a government with a left-wing criterion (right-
15wing criterion) will care only about the poorest (richest) people.
If the political parties do not have policy preferences and the policy space
is one dimensional then the only possible government criterion in equilibrium is
the Downsian one. But if parties are ideological ones and they are uncertain
about preferences of voters then they may have diﬀerent criteria in equilibrium.
Therefore, as Lee (1999), we simply assume that the three criteria are possible
and analyze the results under each one.
The government chooses the level of redistribution taking into account the
eﬀect on the future voting process on R.L e t u s d e ﬁne Re(α)=R∗ (wmed) as





α Tu(ci (α)) + (T − R
e(α))v (4.1)
being Vi the indirect utility function of the individual with wage wi. Let αmed,α r
and αpbe respectively the solution to (4.1) for the individual with the median, the
highest and the poorest wage respectively.












where the ﬁrst term, ∂Vi/∂α, gives us the direct impact on the individual’s utility
of a change in the redistribution degree, α, and the second term, (∂Vi/∂R)(∂Re(α)/∂α),
reﬂects the indirect impact on the utility, as a consequence of the change in the
retirement age chosen by the median voter.
So, depending on the criterion, we can obtain the following results.
Proposition 4.1. i) A Downsian criterion will imply maximal redistribution.
ii) A right-wing criterion does not always imply no redistribution.
iii) A left-wing criterion does not always imply maximal redistribution.


















e(α)τ (wm −  ) < 0. (4.4)








since the utility function is evaluated at Re(α), (4.5) is always equal to zero.
Hence, the indirect impact is zero.
Therefore, (4.3) is always negative which implies that αmed =0 .
ii) and iii) These points are numerically proved in the appendix. Q.E.D.
We have seen that changes in the redistribution degree lead to changes in
the elected retirement age, which aﬀects indirectly the agent’s utility. But this
indirect eﬀect will be null for the median worker since the elected retirement
age will be her own optimal one, hence, her optimal redistribution degree will
only depend on the relation between the median and the mean wage. Therefore,
since under Downsian criterion the government will only care about the worker of
median wage, and since wmed <  ,t h eﬁrst point of the proposition states that a
18government with a Downsian criterion would implement a Social Security system
with maximal redistribution.
With a right-wing criterion, the government chooses the intra-generational
redistribution level of the pension system in order to maximize the utility of the
rich people, in our model represented by the individual with the highest wage, wr.




α Tu(cr (α)) + (T − R
e(α))v. (4.7)












The direct impact will always be positive since the less redistributive the pro-
gram is, the higher the utility of the richest worker would be. But, with respect to
the indirect impact, we have to highlight the following. Since the optimal retire-
ment age of the richest individual, R∗(wr), is higher than the elected one, Re(α),
and taking into account the single peakness of the preferences, if the elected re-
t i r e m e n ta g ew e r ed e l a y e d ,t h ed i ﬀerence between R∗(wr) and Re(α) would be
19shorter. And this would positively aﬀect her utility. Therefore, since an increase
in the redistributive character of the system would postpone the optimal retire-
ment age of the median worker, and consequently the elected one, the indirect
impact of a less redistributive system will be negative.
As we can see in the numerical example of the appendix, when the indirect
eﬀect outweighs the direct eﬀect, the government will implement a positive redis-
tribution degree, i.e., αr < 1.In other words, to achieve a higher legal retirement
age, the richest people would be in favor of a pension system with some level of
intra-generational redistribution.
For the same reason than in the previous point, the conﬂict between the direct
and the indirect eﬀect, the third point of the proposition tells us that, under
a left-wing criterion, it would be possible pension beneﬁts with some positive
earning-related part, that is, with no maximal redistribution. In this last case,
the government would maximize the utility of the lowest wage (wp) individuals,
Vp.
Thus, the government would choose the α that solves the following problem
max
α Vp (R
e(α),α) ≡ Tu(cp (α)) + (T − R
e(α))v. (4.9)
20A g a i nw ec a nd i v i d et h et o t a le ﬀect of an increase in α (a reduction in the
redistributive character of the system) into a direct and an indirect eﬀect. By












Under the left-wing criterion the reasonings are equal to those derived from
the right-wing criterion but in the opposite way. On one hand, the direct impact
will always be negative. A less redistributive pension system would reduce the
income of the poorest people by decreasing their pension beneﬁts, which would
directly aﬀect their utility levels in a negative way. On the other hand, for the
individual with the lowest wage, the indirect eﬀect will always be positive. The
elected legal retirement age, Re(α), is higher than the optimal retirement age of
the poorest individual, R∗(wp), that is, the individual with the lowest wage is
working more than her optimum. Consequently, an increase in α, a reduction
in the redistributive character of the Social Security system that reduces this
elected retirement age by decreasing the median voter’s optimal one, will indirectly
improve the utility level of the poorest individual by reducing her working years.
So, we obtain again opposite eﬀects, and therefore, as we can see in the ap-
21pendix, when the indirect eﬀect outweighs the direct eﬀect, the preferred pension
beneﬁts of the poorest people will have a positive earning-related part, i.e., αp > 0,
in order to achieve a lower legal retirement age in the subsequent voting process.
In summary, we have analyzed three diﬀerent criteria in order to determine the
redistributive character of the Social Security system. Under Downsian criterion
the optimal level of redistribution will depend only on the relation between the
median and the mean wage. Since future changes in the elected legal retirement
a g ew i l ln o ta ﬀect to the median wage worker, given that the elected retirement age
will be her optimal one, and since wmed <  ,there will be maximal redistribution.
Nevertheless, under right- and left-wing criterion, since the future eﬀects on
the elected retirement age derived from the choice of the redistributive character
of the pension system have to be taken into account, it would be possible to
ﬁnd counterintuitive results, that is, a pension system with a positive level of
redistribution, in spite of a right-wing government, or pension beneﬁts with a
positive earning-related part implemented by a left-wing government.10
10It is easy to check that if the government could implement both parameters (R,α),t h e
optimal redistribution degree would respectively be no redistribution, αr =1 , for the right-wing
criterion, and total redistribution, αp =0 , for the left-wing criterion. But, our point is that
changes in the pensionable age will only be achieved by governments with the support of a
vast majority of the population. For that reason we consider a second-best option scheme. The
government chooses a parameter (α) and people choose the other one (R).
225. Conclusions
One of the main reforms to solve the viability of public pension systems is to delay
the pensionable or the legal retirement age. Our paper suggests that, if this reform
were ﬁnally implemented, in order to obtain a bigger political support it would
be appropriated to associate it with an increase in the redistributive character
of the pension system, since it would delay preferred legal retirement ages of the
majority of workers by improving their pension beneﬁts.
We illustrate this result using a two-staged political economy model where,
in the ﬁrst stage, the government decides the redistribution level of the Social
Security program and, in the second one, individuals face a majority voting process
on the legal retirement age. And we obtain that, in order to achieve a high enough
legal retirement age, even if the government cares only about the richest people
the pension system would be set with a positive intra-generational redistribution
degree. Surprisingly, we also ﬁnd that the poorest people would be against a
pension system totally redistributive if this system implies to work too long.
To sum up, from our results it can be deduced that governments trying to
postpone the legal retirement age should take into account that an increase in the
redistributive level of the pension system could guarantee a large social consensus.
23This implies that it will not always be useful to strength the link between life-
time contributions and pension beneﬁts, one of the more habitual measures that
is being proposed to encourage people to work longer. This measure should only




These numerical examples illustrate two cases where respectively the richest people
are better oﬀ with some degree of redistribution than with no redistribution, and
for that reason the implemented redistribution degree under a right-wing criterion
would be strictly positive, that is, αr < 1, and the case where the poorest people
are better oﬀ with some positive earning-related part in the pension beneﬁts,
which will lead to a redistribution degree implemented by a left-wing criterion
government diﬀerent from the maximal one, αp > 0.





24with ρ =0 .1. A wage distribution with the following characteristics: wp =
0.5wmed, =1 .5wmed, wr =2 wmed and τ =0 .3.
We ﬁrst have to determinate R∗ (wmed), i.e., the optimal retirement age of the









+( T − R)v (6.2)
where Wmed = wmed (1 − τ)+τ ((1 − α)  + αwmed) with Wmed = wmed if α =1 .








¢ρ = v. (6.3)











Now, we calculate the utility of the individual evaluated at Re(α)=R∗ (wmed),
that is, the retirement age given by the voting process, and we obtain the indirect
utility of the individual with wage wi,
25Vi (R
e(α),α) ≡ Tu(ci (α)) + (T − R
e(α))v. (6.5)

























We just have to prove that the utility of the richest individual is higher with
some positive level of redistribution than with no redistribution, and that the
utility of the poorest individual is higher with some positive earning-related part
in the pension beneﬁts than with a totally redistributive pension beneﬁts. In other
words, we have to prove respectively
Vr (R




e(α),α>0) >V p (R
e(α),α=0 ). (6.8)
If (6.7) and (6.8) hold, then αr < 1 and αp > 0, that is, a right-wing government
would choose a positive level of redistribution, and on the contrary, a left-wing
26government would not choose total redistribution.
Given that wr = awmed, = bwmed, and wp = dwmed with a>b>1 >d ,













− 1) > 0. (6.9)

























It is easy to check that (6.9) and (6.10) hold for values such as a =2 ,b=1 .5,
27d =0 .5 and τ =0 .3; the values of the benchmark case, and using α =0 .5 for the
two comparisons.
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